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Global climate change, which is associated basically with increases in the average temperature, changes 
in precipitation patterns, rising sea levels, the reduction of the world’s ice masses and snow deposits, and 
the modification of extreme weather patterns, is one of the major challenges facing humankind this 
century. Its impacts on economic activities, populations and ecosystems are significant and in many cases 
irreversible. The challenge of simultaneously adapting to new climatic conditions and participating in an 
international mitigation strategy entails costs of such a magnitude that climate change will heavily 
condition the nature of economic development in the decades ahead. 
 
 The socio-economic, institutional and geographical features of Latin America and the Caribbean 
make climate change a particularly pressing issue in the region. The high sensitivity to climate shifts of 
some of its economic activities, such as agriculture and tourism, the potential loss of biodiversity or of 
human life and the exposure to extreme weather events show how important it is to conduct an economic 
analysis of climate change in order to formulate a sustainable, long-term development strategy that is 
based on sound science and backed by broad social consensus. The global scope of climate change, its 
impact as a negative factor in economic development, the high levels of uncertainty surrounding the 
subject and the need for an effective risk management scheme are fuelling a heated debate about ethics 
and equity, the size of the phenomenon across different periods of time, the channels through which the 
damages are transmitted, the economic costs involved and the best options for confronting them.  
 
 This document presents an aggregate economic analysis of climate change in Latin America and 
the Caribbean based on the national and subregional studies carried out on the topic in the region. It 
summarizes the results obtained and examines only certain topics in detail. The conclusions are still 
preliminary; they seek to enhance understanding of the economic dimension of climate change and 
contribute to the search for possible solutions. This study was carried out during a relatively short time 
frame in close collaboration with the Governments of Germany, Denmark, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, as well as with the European Union and Governments of countries in the region, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the Global Mechanism of the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification and a broad network of academic and research institutions. Responsibility for the 
economic estimates presented herein, however, should be wholly attributed to the authors and not to the 
aforementioned institutions. 
 
 The national studies reveal the diversity of situations present in the region, as well as the richness 
and intensity of the debate surrounding the topic. They also spell out the significant, non-linear economic 
consequences of climate change in the region, which vary according to each country’s socio-economic 
conditions. Furthermore, failure to tackle the issue is shown to be gradually turning into a new limitation 
on economic growth. These analyses have generated new information and new capacities in the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean; the next step is to establish a forum for ongoing research and 
dialogue on the economics of climate change. 
 
 In the twenty-first century, the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean will have to take 
on the challenges posed by climate change, including the costs of adaptation and mitigation. They will 
simultaneously have to address other outstanding issues, such as sustained economic growth, job creation 
and poverty reduction. The region moreover faces the paradox of being a minimal contributor to climate 
change, while nevertheless suffering from a sizeable proportion of the worst consequences. Its position 
will be made much more vulnerable by failure to engage in mitigation efforts within the framework of 
multilateral agreements entered into with the problem’s main instigators.  
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 International agreement on the topic must recognize the different levels of development and the 
asymmetries between the countries or regions that most contribute to climate change through their past 
GHG emissions and those that suffer the worst consequences. Proposals and strategies to tackle climate 
change should not be seen as running counter to economic growth. Solutions to the problems that climate 
change poses will be attainable only within an equitable multilateral international agreement that 
acknowledges not only the global scope of the issue and the shared responsibilities involved, but also the 
historical differences between countries, and that provides for additional financial resources to be made 
available for tackling the challenges of mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. Unilateral 
actions that curb existing flows of funding and access to additional financial resources are not long-term 
solutions and will only exacerbate the region's problems. 
 
 The private sector, the public sector and citizens in general must in their own ways actively 
contribute to the adjustments that will have to be made to secure a more viable future. Innovative 
solutions to the problems brought about by climate change will involve redirecting the economy towards 
low-carbon growth compatible with sustainable development. The atmosphere must be viewed as a global 
public good and its preservation for future generations as an inalienable duty.  
 
 The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean must thus build their future on the actions of the 
present and seize the opportunity to improve quality of life and move towards a more sustainable pattern of 
development. The fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Copenhagen, 2009) represents an invaluable opportunity for the international 
community to formulate an inclusive, fair and equitable strategy in which the exercise of the precautionary 
principle can prevent irreversible damage. At the same time, fundamental development problems persist in the 
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Climate change is, without a doubt, one of the greatest challenges facing humanity in the twenty-first 
century. The increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs), which is fundamentally linked to various 
anthropogenic activities, is causing evident climate changes, such as gradual but steady increases in 
temperature, alterations in precipitation patterns, the reduction of the cryosphere (the world’s ice masses 
and snow deposits), rising sea levels and changes in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events 
(IPCC, 2007a).1 The consequences of climate change for economic activity, populations and ecosystems 
are certainly significant. They will also increase over the course of the century and in many cases be 
difficult to reverse (IPCC, 2007b and Stern, 2007). In this context, the estimated economic costs, both of 
the impacts (including those associated with adaptation) and of mitigation, seem to suggest that climate 
change will play an essential part in determining the characteristics of and options for economic 
development in this century. Hence, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean will have to 
simultaneously tackle the challenges of adapting to new climate conditions and participating in various 
international mitigation strategies. They will also have to ensure their economies are on the road towards 
sustainable development. The magnitude of the task requires the formulation of a long-term strategy 
backed by sound science and a broad social consensus. 
 
 The economic analysis of climate change provides essential input for identifying and drawing up 
strategies to help move countries closer towards solving the problems associated with climate change and 
towards attaining sustainable development. However, such analysis is complex: natural, economic, social, 
technological, environmental and energy processes are involved, as are certain aspects of international 
politics. It deals with very long time-frames and has to take into account planet-wide natural phenomena, 
non-linear impacts, specific limits, asymmetric causes and effects, intense feedback processes, high levels 
of uncertainty and complex risk management, as well as ethical considerations. In this regard, it is 
important to acknowledge two fundamental aspects of the economic analysis of climate change: 
 
• The uncertainty margins are large because the analysis includes the complex process of 
assessing the risks associated with weather events that are sometimes catastrophic. The 
projections are thus merely scenarios that have a certain probability of occurring; they are not 
specific prognoses. There is an ethical component to the economic analysis of climate change 
as it refers to the well-being of future generations and touches on matters that have no explicit 
market value, such as biodiversity and human life. 
 
• Formulating proposals and strategies to solve climate-change problems should not be seen as 
countering economic growth. On the contrary, it is failing to address the issue that will have a 
negative impact on economic growth. Tackling the problems brought about by climate 
change means redirecting the economy towards low-carbon growth that is compatible with 
sustainable development.  
                                                     
1  GHG emissions are expressed in equivalent CO2 in terms of global warming potential measured over 100 years 
as set out in the IPCC Second Assessment Report (IPCC, 1996). The GHGs included are: carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and those with high warming potential, such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), 
perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6 ). In keeping with the reports submitted by countries for 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the energy sector, industrial 
processing and agriculture are taken into account, as well as land-use change, forestry and waste levels. The 
energy sector is subdivided into electricity and heating, transportation, manufacturing and construction, other 
types of fuel burn and fugitive gas emissions. 
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 The purpose of this study is to present an aggregate economic analysis of climate change in Latin 
America and the Caribbean based on national studies carried out on the topic, with a view to increasing 
understanding of the economic dimension of the issue and contributing to the discovery of possible 
solutions and alternatives. It should be noted that the estimates presented are preliminary and incomplete. 
They are the result of various restrictive assumptions made about the economies of the region based on 
data that are comparable but do not necessarily coincide with official figures. In all events, the goal of the 
analysis is to identify aggregate trends for the region, not to present specific cases. The estimates for each 
country do not necessarily coincide with the aggregate results and are reported in the individual country 
studies (www.eclac.cl/dmaah/).  
 
 
II. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
The economic analysis of climate change is subject of heated debate. It employs a range of methods and 
techniques (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000 and Stern, 2007), each with its own advantages and biases, and no 
single one stands out as superior to the others. All start with the definition of the baseline or business as 
usual (BAU) scenario as a point of comparison for estimating the economic impacts of climate change 
and the processes of adaptation and mitigation. Two basic strategic lines of enquiry are in use:  
 
• The analysis of the economic impacts of climate change starts with the identification of a 
baseline scenario for economic activity that does not take the impact of climate change into 
account and then projects economic growth for each sector and the economy as a whole under 
the impact of climate change (see figure II.1(a)). The difference between the two curves, 
which are adjusted according to the chosen discount rate, represents the economic 
consequences of climate change. It should be borne in mind that adaptation to climate change 
will significantly modify the final result and that some of the more important effects of 
climate change have no direct economic value.  
 
• The economic analysis of mitigation is based on the construction of the baseline scenario for 
GHG emissions by the economy as a whole or by certain economic sectors or activities. The 
costs associated with lowering GHG emissions from this baseline level according to specific 
targets (through what are known as “wedges”) are then estimated and a discount rate is 






CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC IMPACT AND MITIGATION SCENARIOS 
 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
 
 
 Given the diverse situations in the region and the existence of conditions and effects that are 
specific to individual countries, a range of analytical methods were used in this study. In all instances, 
however, rigorous methodologies based on a consistent theoretical framework were applied wherever 
possible, and certain empirical regularities have made it possible to present an informed and comparable 
overview of climate change from an economic perspective. All the studies define a baseline as the point 
of reference and then consider the inherent features of climate change, which determine the specific type 
of analyses that are to be performed.  
 
 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 
 
 
According to the global scientific evidence available (IPCC, 2007a), significant changes in climate are 
occurring, basically as a result of a set of anthropogenic activities, the symptoms of which include: 
 
• A gradual and steady increase in the average temperature of the planet, albeit with significant 
differences between regions and between land and sea temperature patterns (IPCC, 2007a). 
The average temperature in fact rose by 0.8oC between 1850-1899 and 2001-2005, with the 
sharpest rises being recorded in the last few decades. This has been reflected in an increase in 
the number of extremely hot days and a decline in the number of extremely cold days (IPCC, 
2007a). Historical data confirm that the current average temperature is the highest in the last 
500 years, that the temperature during the last 50 years is unusual in relation to the last 1,300 
years, and that 11 of the 12 hottest years since 1859 were registered between 1995 and 2006 
(IPPC, 2007a, page 5). 
 
• Significant changes in global precipitation patterns, with an intensification of hydrological 
patterns. Furthermore, the correlation between higher temperatures and lower precipitation 
levels heightens the impact of weather phenomena (Madden and Williams, 1978; and 




























• Ocean temperatures are rising, although at different rates, in association with a gradual but 
significant reduction of the cryosphere and the melting of glaciers in both hemispheres 
(IPCC, 2007a, page 5). The melting of the ice caps contributes to the rise of the sea level 
(IPCC, 2007a, page 5).  
 
• Modifications in the types and in the intensity and frequency patterns of extreme weather 
events. Temperature rises make alterations in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather 
events more likely, although doubts still surround the expected changes in their probability 
distributions (Vincent and others, 2005; Aguilar and others, 2005; Kiktev and others, 2003; 
IPCC, 2007a, page 300; Marengo and others, 2009a and b). 
 
 The influence of anthropogenic activity on the climate is strong according to various models and 
at different levels of uncertainty, and there is high confidence that current climate patterns are associated 
with GHG emissions (IPCC, 2007a). Climate change can therefore only be properly simulated by 
considering both natural and anthropogenic forcings (IPCC, 2007a). The increase of GHGs in the 
atmosphere since the start of the industrial revolution has been notable. Current concentration levels are 
the highest in 420,000 years (Siegenthaler and others, 2005 and IPCC, 2007a, page 465). The projections 
and simulations performed using climate models (IPCC, 2007a and 2007b) seem to indicate that if the 
inertial growth in GHG emissions continues unabated, the average temperature this century could rise by 
between 1ºC and 6ºC, depending on the emissions scenario used. This increase in temperature would be 
accompanied by a rise of 18-59 centimetres in sea levels as well as by other climate phenomena such as 
changes in global precipitation patterns, a reduction of the cryosphere and glaciers and an increase in the 
number and intensity of extreme weather events. The effects of feedback are likely (albeit with a high 
degree of uncertainty) to intensify the projected changes in global climate.  
 
 
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
 
Climate projections for Latin America and the Caribbean indicate that the average temperature will 
continue to rise gradually but persistently, albeit at different rates across the region, and that there will be 
changes in the volume, intensity and frequency patterns of precipitation (see map IV.1). Climate will 
become increasingly variable, and the incidence of extreme temperature events, such as heat waves, will 
therefore increase. The average temperature in South America is projected to rise steadily, by between 
1oC and 4oC under the lowest-emissions (B2) scenario, and by between 2°C and 6°C under the highest-
emissions (A2) scenario (see map IV.1).2  
 
                                                     
2  The A2 scenario is based on a dynamic international economy and intensive fossil fuel consumption that 
generates GHG concentrations in the atmosphere far above those observed at present. The B2 scenario is based 




SOUTH AMERICA: TEMPERATURE PROJECTIONS a 
(Centigrade) 
 













































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from National 
Institute of Spatial Research (INPE) of Brazil. 
a  Annual atmospheric temperature changes projected for 2011-2040, 2041–2070, 2071–2100 for the A2 and B2 scenarios 
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 Projections of changes in precipitation patterns are more complex, and the ones for the region are 
particularly uncertain. Precipitation forecasts for the central and tropical regions of South America range 
from a 20%-40% reduction to a 5%-10% increase over the period 2071-2100 (see map IV.2).  
 
Map IV.2 
SOUTH AMERICA: PROJECTED CHANGES IN PRECIPITATION a 
(Percentages) 
 









































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from National 
Institute of Spatial Research (INPE) of Brazil. 
a  Annual atmospheric precipitation changes projected for 2011-2040, 2041–2070, 2071–2100 for the A2 and B2 scenarios 
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 Climate projections show a steady increase in extreme weather events (see map IV.3). Rainfall is 
expected to increase over central Mexico and the tropical and south-eastern parts of South America. 
Climate models reveal a 10% average increase and a rising trend in precipitation in north-eastern Ecuador, 
Peru and south-eastern South America and a drop in rainfall in eastern Amazonia and the north-east of 
Brazil, the central-northern parts of Chile and most of Mexico and Central America. Continuous dry spells 
will tend to increase in Mexico, Central America and all of South America (except Ecuador, north-eastern 
Peru and Colombia) because precipitation levels are projected to change (rise or fall) by less than 10%. 
Although the intensity of precipitations is expected to increase in general in Latin America, dry spells 
between rainy periods will become longer and average precipitation levels will drop. Temperatures are 
rising in most of South and Central America and heat waves are expected to become increasingly common 
all over the region, especially in the Caribbean, south-eastern South America and Central America. There 
is also expected to be a steady and significant increase in hotter nights across Latin America, especially in 
Mexico and Central America and the subtropical parts of South America. 
 
Map IV.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MULTI-MODEL AVERAGES OF SPATIAL PATTERNS OF 
CHANGES IN EXTREMES UNDER SCENARIO A1B a 
 




























Source: C. Tebaldi and others, “Going to the extremes: an intercomparison of model-simulated historical and future changes in 
extreme events”, Climatic Change, vol. 79, 2006. 
a  The figures show the difference between the averages for two twenty-year periods (2080–2099 and 1980–1999). The values 
for each model were standardized, and then a multi-model average was calculated. The dotted sections indicate areas in 
which at least five of the nine models concur that the change is statistically significant. 
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 The available evidence on Central America for 1950-2000 shows higher temperatures and more 
volatility (see map IV.4). Precipitation maps reveal the concentration of rainfall in the period spanning 
approximately May to October and the difference between rainfall patterns along the Atlantic and Pacific 
coasts and between the northern and southern parts of the isthmus (map IV.5). Year-on-year variations in 
rainfall are high, associated with El Niño - Southern Oscillation. The projected changes in climate are 
summarized in table IV.1. 
 
Map IV.4 
CENTRAL AMERICA: AVERAGE TEMPERATURES IN THE MONTHS OF JANUARY, APRIL, 
JULY AND OCTOBER, 1950-2000 
(Centigrade) 
 

























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the 

































































CENTRAL AMERICA: AVERAGE PRECIPITATION IN THE MONTHS OF JANUARY, APRIL, 
JULY AND OCTOBER, 1950-2000 
(Millimetres) 
 
























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the 




CENTRAL AMERICA: PROJECTED CHANGES IN TEMPERATURE AND PRECIPITATION, 
2020, 2050 AND 2080 
Changes in temperature (Centigrade) 
Season 
2020 2050 2080 
Dry +0.4 to +1.1 +1.0 to +3.0 +1.0 to +5.0 
Rainy +0.5 to +1.7 +1.0 to +4.0 +1.3 to +6.6 
 Changes in precipitation (Percentages) 
 2020 2050 2080 
Dry –7 to +7 –12 to +5 –20 to +8 
Rainy –10 to +4 –15 to +3 –30 to +5 
Source:  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability.Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 







































































 There is a high degree of uncertainty about the climate scenarios for the Caribbean (IPCC, 
2007a). Nevertheless, the projections for both the Atlantic and the Caribbean are presented in table IV.2. 
Evidence points to an increase in extreme weather events, mainly in the form of hurricanes.  
 
Table IV.2 
THE CARIBBEAN: CLIMATE SCENARIOS 
Variable Scenario 
Temperature  Increase of between 0.8°C and 2.5°C by 2050 and of between 0.9° and 4°C by 2080 
Precipitation 
Variation of between -36.3% and +34.2% by 2050 and of between -49.3% and +28.9% 
by the end of the century  
Sea level Could rise by 35 cm by the end of the century 
Extreme weather events  The frequency of hurricanes increases by 5%-10% over the course of the century 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007 - The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambrigde University Press, 2007 and Climate Change 2007- Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, 
Cambrigde University Press, 2007. 
 
Box IV.1 
THE CARIBBEAN: A2 AND B2 CLIMATE SCENARIOS 
 
The different climate scenarios seem to suggest that changes in temperature and rainfall patterns could vary 
significantly in the Caribbean, as shown in maps 1 and 2. Nevertheless, average temperatures are expected to rise by 
between 2.3oC and 3.4oC for the region as a whole by the end of the century (Centella and others, 2008).  
 
Map 1 
ANNUAL TEMPERATURE VARIATIONS 
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Box IV.1 (concluded) 
 
Map 2 
PROJECTED CHANGES IN PRECIPITATION LEVELS 
 


























Source:  A. Centella, A. Bezanilla and K. Leslie, A Study of the Uncertainty in Future Caribbean Climate Using the PRECIS 
Regional Climate Model. Technical Report, Belmopan, Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC), 2008. 
 
 
 The climate change patterns projected for 2100 in Latin America are summarized in map IV.6. 
The figures are based on the projected changes in climate averages and extremes as shown in Meehl and 
others (2007, chapter 10), Christensen and others (2007, chapter 11, cited in IPCC, 2007a), and Magrin 
and others (2007, cited in IPCC, 2007b). 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SUMMARY OF CLIMATE CHANGE PATTERNS 




























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from National 
Institute of Spatial Research (INPE) of Brazil. 
a  The confidence levels are based on the statistically significant levels of coincidence determined for the sign of change by a 






The available scientific evidence shows that the global warming associated with the increase in GHGs 
generated by anthropogenic activity is creating noticeable changes in climate, such as: higher 
temperatures, alterations in precipitation patterns, the reduction of the cryosphere, rising sea levels and 
changes in extreme weather patterns. Projections suggest that it is highly likely that temperatures will rise 
on average by between 1oC and 6 oC and that precipitation patterns will change, with rainfall rising in 
some cases by 5%-10% and falling in others by 20%-40%. Furthermore, part of the glaciers in the 
Andean countries are expected to melt, extreme weather events in the Caribbean, Central America and the 
tropical and subtropical parts of South America will probably increase, and changes may occur in climate 







Increase in precipitation extremes
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V. THE MACROECONOMIC SITUATION 
 
 
The long-term growth of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean is without a doubt shaped by 
a complex web of factors and interdependencies. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a set of regular 
empirical patterns on which to base future scenarios and their respective baselines or BAU counterparts. 
Altogether, in the economies of the region, as in modern economies on the whole, over the long term 
GDP and per capita GDP follow an upward trend with oscillations that are usually auto-correlated 
(Hodrick and Prescott, 1997, Blanchard, 1997, Fisher, 1994). The adequate identification of the trend and 
its respective probabilities distribution allows for long-term projections to be made by taking into 
consideration the levels of uncertainty determined on the basis of the historical evidence available for 
each country. 
 
 Historically, GDP and per capita GDP trends in the region have varied considerably, with average 
growth rates differing across countries and periods (see figure V.1). In Latin America and the Caribbean 
as a whole, growth was more sluggish in 1980-2008 than in 1950-1980 (see figure V.2), while GDP and 
per capita GDP, to different degrees, remained volatile (see figure V.1), as reflected in the oscillations 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ANNUAL STANDARD DEVIATION AND AVERAGE 





















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Economic Indicators and 
Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP at 2000 constant prices and Social Indicators and Statistics Database 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES, 























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Economic Indicators and 
Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP 2000 constant prices and Social Indicators and Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
 
 
 The available evidence suggests that the per capita growth curves of the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean are not on course for absolute convergence (β-convergence) or for 
convergence of the dispersion in per capita GDP (σ-convergence) (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). In 
other words, the growth of the countries with lower per capita GDP is not greater than the growth of the 
countries with higher per capita GDP. As shown in figure V.3, the relationship between these variables 
alters over time, and, for some decades, there has been no statistically significant relationship between 
them whatsoever not even a slightly positive one. During the entire period 1950-2008, the relationship 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GDP VERSUS AVERAGE 
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH RATE 
(Percentages and 2000 dollars) 
 







































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Economic Indicators and 
Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP 2000 constant prices and Social Indicators and Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
a  Includes the countries for which per capita GDP figures have been available since 1990: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, 
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 This does not mean, of course, that no conditional convergence is observed in per capita GDP or 
no convergence among groups of relatively similar countries, when adjustments are made for a set of 
variables (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and the probability of changing group is low.  
 
 The results show that the GDP and per capita GDP paths projected per country are consistent with 
the historical data available and that the historical evidence on each country can provide a reasonable 
prediction of the future. The economies of the region are thus expected to perform over the next few 
decades as they have done historically. 
 
Box V.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GDP PROJECTIONS 
 
The trend for per capita GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean is upward, but with oscillations and at different 
paces. The average growth rate of per capita GDP over 1950-2008 was 1.8%, but in 1950-1980, the rate was much 
higher, over 2%. In 1980-2000, per capita GDP growth fell and was even negative for some of those years before 
picking up again as of 2001. The projections suggest that per capita GDP growth for the region as a whole will be 
1.8%, with a 60% probability that it will be between 1.1% and 2.5%.  
 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GDP AND PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH, WITH 
THE HODRICK-PRESCOTT FILTER AND THE RESPECTIVE FAN CHART, 1950-2008 a 
 
 (a) Per capita GDP (b) Growth rate  






















Average Upper limit 
 60 1.1 1.8 2.5 
 20 -2.0 -0.7 1.1 





Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Economic Indicators and 
Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP 2000 constant prices and Social Indicators and Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data.  
a  Only those countries for which data have been available from 1950 onwards are included in the per capita GDP calculations 
for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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The analysis of climate change uses various methods but generally involves the construction of a baseline 
(business as usual) scenario as a point of reference. In the analysis of the economic impact, this baseline is 
compared with scenarios including and excluding the effects of climate change. Mitigation scenarios are 
projected using a baseline scenario of GHG emissions.  
 
 The economic analysis of climate change requires the construction of long-term economic 
scenarios that should not be used for making short-term projections. The macroeconomic scenarios 
constructed for each country are based on historical evidence and regular patterns detected in the region’s 
economies over the last 50 years. These reveal three notable characteristics:  
 
• The basic trend in the economies of Latin America is positive growth with oscillations.  
 
• Annual growth rates oscillate considerably, and structural changes in their average trajectories 
can be used to mark the divisions between growth periods. This shows that an initial period of 
relatively high growth was followed first by a period of more sluggish growth and then by a 
period of recovery witnessed in more recent years prior to the present crisis. 
 
• There is no absolute convergence in per capita GDP among the countries of Latin America.  
 
 These characteristics suggest that:  
 
• The projected economic scenarios are consistent with the evidence that there is no absolute 
convergence under way in the region.  
 
• The projected per capita GDP growth rates are based on the assumption that growth will 






VI. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
 
The impacts of climate change in the region are multiple, heterogeneous, nonlinear and of differing 
magnitudes, and they are certainly significant despite some considerable lingering uncertainty about their 
transmission channels and their exact magnitude (Samaniego, 2009). Also, vulnerability to extreme 
climatic events is high (for example the increase, over the past three decades, in the occurrence of El Niño 
and Southern Oscillation events, in the frequency and intensity of hurricanes in Central America and the 
Caribbean, and in extreme rains in the south-east region of South America). On the basis of information 
available from Regional Economics of Climate Change Studies (RECCS), these impacts through 2100 
can be synthesized in the following points: 
 
 The results clearly show that there is solid evidence to support the argument that climate change 
is associated with significant economic impacts on the agricultural sector in the Latin American and the 
Caribbean region. These impacts are, however, very heterogeneous by country and region and moreover 
demonstrate nonlinear behaviour. Some regions and countries will thus enjoy temporary windfalls as a 
result of moderate increases in temperature and changes in precipitation, though the negative impacts will 
prevail in the long term. The main effects of climate change on the agricultural sector in the Latin 
America and the Caribbean region are likely to be as follows: 
 
(i) Countries situated in the southern region of the continent, such as Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay, could see temperatures rising by between 1.5°C and 2°C over the period 2030-
2050, generating possible positive effects in agricultural productivity, though this does not 
take into consideration potential problems related to the appearance or the spread of pests 
and diseases, or water-supply constraints as a result of melting glaciers (especially in Chile 
and western Argentina). However, beyond this threshold the effects on agricultural 
production will turn negative. 
 
(ii) In Paraguay, under global emissions scenario A2, significant drops in wheat and cotton 
yields are expected as of 2030, with soy production decreasing as of 2050, whereas corn, 
sugar cane and cassava production may increase.  
 
(iii) In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the agricultural frontier is expected to continue to 
expand and agricultural production and employment will continue to be essential to the 
country throughout the remainder of the century. The results of crop analyses at the local 
level show that, on the whole, agricultural yields will be higher in areas with moderate 
temperatures and precipitation and might increase in higher-altitude areas, though impacts 
would be significant in regions that have extreme temperatures and precipitation.  
 
(iv) In Chile, the forestry and agriculture sector will be affected differently. While yields will 
increase for some crops and regions as restrictively low temperatures rise (southern Chile), 
other crops and regions of the country will see sharp declines due to shortages in irrigation 
water and rainfall (central and northern regions of the country).  
 
(v) In Ecuador, climate change will have consequences that differ among agricultural production 
units. For example, for subsistence farms, a 1°C rise in temperature would cause an increase 
in crop yields, but this would be reversed once a 2°C threshold is crossed. For intermediate 
farms, a 1°C increase would affect banana, cocoa, and plantain production. 
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(vi) In Colombia a possible 4°C rise in the average temperature is forecast by the end of the 
twenty-first century, which will mean an approximate 700-metre rise in the altitude band 
that marks the optimal temperature threshold for some crops.  
 
(vii) In Central America it is observed that, on average, the maximum temperature has already 
exceeded, by several degrees, the optimal for the crop yield index for several crops, which 
suggests further losses if temperatures continue to rise. Also, during the rainy season 
cumulative precipitation levels are greater than the optimal for maximizing productivity, 
which suggests that a minor reduction could improve yields, but a significant reduction 
could mean losses. A more disaggregated analysis suggests possible losses in basic grains 
in regions with less precipitation, such as the Pacific slope.  
 
(viii) For the Caribbean, the results obtained show that increasing precipitation levels could 
cause positive impacts on agricultural production in Guyana, whereas yields in Trinidad 
and Tobago could decline, owing mainly to increased incidence of farmland flooding. In 
the Netherlands Antilles, rising temperatures would benefit agriculture as a whole; the 
Dominican Republic would experience a similar impact. Generally, rising temperatures are 
not expected to affect sugar cane production any significant way, whereas crops, such as 
plantain, cocoa, coffee and rice are likely to be more susceptible. 
 
 The final net result of climate change impacts on agriculture also depends on a wide range of 
variables (these include the spread of pests, diseases and weeds, soil degradation and shortages of water 
for irrigation) and can change according to the capacity of CO2 in fertilization for reversing the negative 
effect of rising temperatures and water deficits and as a function of the processes of adaptation and 
technological innovation.  
 
 Soil degradation is without a doubt a fundamental long-term problem in the Latin American and the 
Caribbean region and will increasingly affect production conditions for the agricultural sector. Available land 
degradation evidence is summarized in table VI.1, which shows that in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru the areas that will potentially be degraded by the year 2100 are significant 




LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): ESTIMATED LOSSES CAUSED BY LAND DEGRADATION 










area in 2050 
(Km2) 
Degraded 










Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  60 339 5.5 123 301 243 979 11.2 22.2 
Chile 77 230 10.2 157 818 312 278 20.8 41.2 
Ecuador 40 136 14.2 82 017 162 289 28.9 57.2 
Paraguay 66 704 16.4 136 308 269 716 33.5 66.3 
Peru 197 211 15.3 402 996 797 418 31.3 62.0 
Source: Prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Global 
Mechanism of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, Global Land Degradation Assessment 





CENTRAL AMERICA: EFFECTS OF TEMPERATURE 
AND PRECIPITATION ON AGRICULTURE 
 
 
Generally, the impacts of climate change are heterogeneous and nonlinear, as different crops have specific limits of 
tolerance and resistance. Accordingly, inflection points can occur in impact patterns. Conventional specifications for 
identifying climate impacts on agriculture assume a concave relationship to yields and production or both; this 


























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
 
 Areas of South America that are currently relatively dry will experience a further decrease in the 
availability of water. A decrease of up to 30% in annual precipitation may be observed as a result of a 2°C 
increase in global temperatures and of between 40% and 50% with a 4°C increase (Warren, and others, 
2006). This will substantially increase the number of persons who will have difficulty accessing clean 
water in 2025. Some areas of Latin America are expected to experience severe water stress, which will 
affect the water supply and hydroelectric power generation (particularly in the Andean countries and in 
the subtropical region of South America, which are highly dependent on hydroelectric energy). In 
addition, some glaciers will shrink or disappear, which will also cause water shortages and reduce 
hydroelectric power generation (CEDEPLAR/UFMG/FIOCRUZ, 2008). Under any climate scenario, 
Central America is expected to see its water availability affected by variations in temperature and 
precipitation, particularly on the Pacific slope, with increased salt content in coastal aquifers and in 
aquifers with high evaporation rates. The region is also expected to face greater problems with water 
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projected increases in precipitation, as a consequence of the variability of rainfall. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that the number of dry days has increased. Cloudiness is also expected to increase, as is the 
number and intensity of tropical storms and cyclones. 
 
 The health impacts of climate change in the region will be related mostly to heat stress, malaria, 
dengue fever, cholera, respiratory illnesses and other conditions related to changes in precipitation, the 
availability of water and air quality (Githeko and Woodward, 2003; CEDEPLAR/UFMG/FIOCRUZ, 
2008). Also, as a result of the loss of stratospheric ozone and increased ultraviolet rays, cases of non-
melanoma skin cancer will increase in the southernmost regions of the continent (parts of Chile and 
Argentina) (Magrin, and others, 2007), as will morbidity and mortality due to heat waves. It is worth 
mentioning that the northeastern region of Brazil will be especially sensitive to climate-change-related 
health issues. 
 
 The rise in sea level will increase the number of people displaced and the land lost due to 
permanent flooding. Small Caribbean island states will be strongly impacted. The rising sea level will 
cause the disappearance of mangroves on the lower coasts (northern coasts of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, 
French Guyana and Guyana), damaging fishing grounds. Coastal flooding and land erosion will affect 
water quantity and quality. The intrusion of seawater could exacerbate socio-economic and health 
problems in these areas (Magrin and others, 2007). Furthermore, there are serious threats to the coastal 
areas of the River Plate (Argentina and Uruguay) due to increasing storm waves and rising sea levels.  
 
 According to some weather models, a 3°C increase in global temperatures could translate into 
sharp declines in precipitation in the Amazon region, which will cause substantial deterioration of the 
jungles that are home to the world’s greatest biodiversity (Stern, 2008) and the risk even exists that some 
parts of the Amazon jungle will become savannah. On the continental and insular coasts of the Caribbean 
Sea, 1°C to 2°C increases will trigger increasingly frequent incidents of coral reef bleaching. Due to the 
concentrations of endemic species in the region, Latin America hosts seven of the world's 25 most critical 
biodiversity sites. Thus, climate change is putting at risk a significant portion of the planet’s biodiversity 
(see box VI.2).  
 
 The countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region will be affected by climate variations 
and extreme events, which include, for example, the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and its 
counterpart, La Niña, extreme precipitation events and tropical storms (Zapata-Martí and Saldaña-
Zorrilla, 2009). In 2100 the cost of climatic disasters, in constant 2008 prices, will move from an annual 
average of almost US$ 8.6 billion for the 2000-2008 period to i) US$ 11 billion at a 4% discount rate; 
ii) US$ 64 billion at a 2% discount rate; and iii) US$ 250 billion at 0.5% discount rate. (see figure VI.1) 






BIODIVERSITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
 
According to the National Institute of Biodiversity (INBio) of Costa Rica, Central America’s great geologic, 
geographic, climatic and biotic diversity represents 7% of the planet’s biodiversity. Multiple factors, that vary from 
country to country, such as deforestation, soil and air pollution, have negative effects on biodiversity. Beyond 
existing pressures, climate change will exert additional pressure through altered precipitation patterns, rising 
temperatures and larger numbers of extreme events, all of which translate into greater losses of biodiversity. A 
potential biodiversity index has been constructed to identify the impacts of climate change. The figure below 
presents results of climate change simulations under scenario A1B, which show a decline in the index for all 
countries of the region. 
 
CENTRAL AMERICA (7 COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION OF THE POTENTIAL BIODIVERSITY INDEX, 




















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
 The direct market costs of biodiversity related to ecotourism, live animals, animal products, certified forest 
production (sustainable), organic farming, non-timber forest production and bioprospecting are estimated at 
US$ 179.81 million for the entire Central American region. Indirect costs were obtained using an agricultural 
production function that includes the biodiversity index, estimating the marginal contribution of biodiversity to 
production and, thereby, the shadow price for ecosystem-related services. The average estimated cost for the region 
in 2080, with a discount rate of 0.5%, could be around 8.33% of GDP. The direct costs are estimated based on 
biodiversity market values and the indirect costs have to do with agricultural production. As in other cases, the costs 
are relatively low up to 2030 and then start to climb, rising exponentially after 2050.  
 
Scenario A1B 
CENTRAL AMERICA: PRESENT VALUE OF ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE COSTS BY CUT-OFF YEAR 
IN THE BIODIVERSITY SECTOR UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO A1B 
(Percentages of 2008 GDP) 
 
Discount rate Years 
0.50% 2.0% 4.0% 
2020 0.17 0.15 0.12 
2030 0.55 0.44 0.34 
2050 2.06 1.36 0.82 
2080 8.33 3.95 1.65 
2100 19.63 7.26 2.33 




































































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COST OF CLIMATE DISASTERS, 2009-2100 

























The empirical evidence for the Latin American and Caribbean region shows that climate change does 
have significant impacts on the region’s economies. However, these effects are extremely heterogeneous 
by regions and over time, with nonlinear behaviour, different magnitudes and, in some cases, irreversible 
consequences. Examples of these impacts are:  
 
• The impacts of climate change in the agricultural sector differ by crop, region, type of land 
and economic agents. In certain parts of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and in some regions 
of countries with temperate climates, a moderate rise in temperature could have positive 
impacts on the agricultural sector for a certain time frame. On the other hand, in tropical 
regions and in Central America, rising temperatures will have gradually worsening negative 
impacts. Furthermore, the impacts of climate change on soil degradation are significant and 
negative in all instances. 
 
• Climate change will generally cause additional pressures on water resources in Argentina, 
Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Central America and the Caribbean, as a consequence of changes 
in precipitation, rising temperatures and increased demand. This will have major negative 
consequences principally for agricultural production and the use of hydroelectric dams. Short-
term, in some regions, a phenomenon might occur by which water availability will increase as 



























































Rate of 4% Rate of 2% Rate of 0.5% No discount rate
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• Great uncertainty persists about the possible impacts of climate change on morbidity and 
mortality related to diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. However, the information 
available suggests that the spread of these diseases will extend beyond current geographical 
boundaries, increasing the number of people affected.  
 
• The rise in sea level will cause the disappearance of mangroves in lower coastal areas (the 
northern coasts of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guyana and Guyana), as well as coastal 
flooding and land erosion. It will also affect infrastructure and buildings near the coasts, such 
as along the River Plate (Argentina and Uruguay), and will significantly damage activities 
such as tourism, particularly in the Caribbean.  
 
• Climate change will cause significant, often irreversible, losses in biodiversity, which is 
particularly serious in a region that encompasses several of the most biodiverse countries in 
the world. Nevertheless, these physical losses have no economic value because a significant 
portion of ecosystem-related services cannot be adequately quantified or included in the 
market.  
 
• The evidence available about extreme events, such as intense rains and prolonged dry periods 
and heatwaves, suggests that changes in patterns, frequency and intensity will result in 
increased costs. These changes will have major impacts on subregions, such as Central 
America and the Caribbean, and on economic activities such as tourism, as well as triggering 
extreme precipitation events over a large portion of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Seventy per cent of the continent currently suffers recurrent flooding, and intense droughts 
are punishing the region’s most important productive systems.  
 
 In this context, it is essential to design a regional strategy aimed at reducing the severest impacts 
of climate change and preventing those that are unacceptable, such as the irreversible loss of biodiversity, 






VII. MITIGATION PROCESSES 
 
 
The projected emission scenarios have climatic consequences that are unquestionably significant. They 
imply, for example, a high probability of a temperature rise of 2oC by 2050 and 3oC or even 4oC by the 
end of the century (IPCC, 2007b).  
 
 Emissions of greenhouse gases by the Latin American and Caribbean region show complex 
behaviour over time, as a result of the interaction of multiple factors. Latin America’s total emissions 
represent a small share at the global level and, moreover, decreased as a proportion of total emissions 
between 1990 and 2000. South America’s share dropped from 11.5% of the total in 1990 to 9.71% in 
2000; Central America’s fell from 0.94% to 0.71% and that of the Caribbean edged up from 0.28% to 
0.30% (see figure VII.1).3 This pattern is the net result of two opposing trends: a steady rise in emissions 
from energy consumption and, recently, an overall reduction in emissions from land-use change. In 
absolute terms, emissions are concentrated in a few countries, especially Argentina, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, with the other countries accounting for a 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE IN TOTAL GHG EMISSIONS 















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009. 
a  Includes carbon dioxide (CO2), ammonium sulphate (NH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Land-use change data are not available for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
 
 Globally speaking, 60% of emissions come from the burning of fossil fuels and cement 
production, followed by those generated by land-use change and the agricultural sector. In South 
America, however, the energy sector generated only 21%, land-use change 51% and agriculture 24% of 
                                                     
3  For purposes of comparability, the information on emissions is taken from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool 
(CAIT) Version 6.0 (WRI, 2009), which occasionally does not coincide with the official emissions inventories. 



























total emissions. In Central America, the energy sector produced 13% and land-use change 85% of the 
total. In the Caribbean, the energy sector represented 97% of total emissions, although data are lacking for 
most of the countries of the subregion. So, compared with world averages, the Latin American and 
Caribbean region produces more emissions from land-use change and fewer from the energy sector.  
 
 GHG emissions from the energy sector and cement production in Latin America and the 
Caribbean still represent a small proportion of total global emissions, although they have been on the rise: 
from 7% in 1990 to 8.2% in 2000. In 1990-2000, this category of emissions posted a growth rate of 2.9% 
for South America, 3.0% for Central America and 1.2% for the Caribbean, compared with the worldwide 
rate of 1.0%. This is evidence that, overall, emissions from the energy sector in the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries are still relatively small, although they are increasing faster than the world average, 
albeit with large differences from one country to another. Urbanization, access to energy, 




1. Emissions and energy in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
CO2 emissions associated with energy consumption and cement production in the region overall are tending 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE GROWTH RATES OF 






















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009 and Economic 










































 The relations between GHG emissions originating in the energy sector and generated by cement 
manufacturing and energy consumption, GDP and population may be formalized using the IPAT or Kaya 
identity (O'Neill and others, 2001). Greater economic growth (reflected in rising per capita GDP) or an 
increase in the population may be expected to lead to higher levels of emissions and greater energy 
consumption. However, a gradual process of energy decoupling (ratio of energy to GDP) and 
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 Historical trends in GHG emissions in the Latin America and Caribbean region indicate that, 
generally speaking, emissions are negatively correlated with energy decoupling and decarbonization, and 
positively correlated with population and per capita income, although to different extents from one 
country to another (see figure VII.3).  
 
Figure VII.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF CO2 
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 The evolution of energy consumption in Latin America and the Caribbean shows an overall 
upward trend, reflected in a higher growth rate than the world average. Energy consumption rose at a rate 
of 3.15% for Latin America and the Caribbean overall in 1970-2007, above the global average of 2.11%, 
with the level of consumption and rate of increase varying among countries (see figure VII.4). Energy 


























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Latin American Energy 
Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System (SIEE), for total energy consumption statistics.  
 
 
 The evidence available for Latin America and the Caribbean shows a strong positive correlation 
between energy consumption and per capita GDP (see figure VII.5) and between per capita energy 






































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION TO 
PER CAPITA GDP, 2007 



















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Latin American 
Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System (SIEE), for total energy consumption statistics and 
Economic Indicators and Statistics Database (BADECON) for data on per capita GDP at 2000 constant prices. 
 
Figure VII.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION TO 
PER CAPITA GDP, 2007 



















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Latin American 
Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System (SIEE), for total energy consumption statistics and 
























































































 Energy intensity (the ratio of energy consumption to GDP) varies by country in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (see figure VII.7a) and, in general, is still below the world average. There is an inverse 
correlation between energy intensity and per capita GDP (see figure VII.7(b)). However, this process of 
energy decoupling is not yet enough to halt the growth of energy consumption in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in absolute terms, as the current style of growth still requires high energy consumption. 
Accordingly, any agreement that caps total energy consumption must be approached with extreme caution 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GDP AND ENERGY INTENSITY, 2007 a 
(Thousands of barrels of oil equivalent and 2000 dollars) 
 















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Latin 
American Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System (SIEE) for total energy consumption 
statistics, and Economic Indicators and Statistics Database (BADECON) for data on per capita GDP at 2000 constant 
prices.  
a The size of the circumferences in figure VII.7a is relative to the per capita GDP of the respective country.  
 
 
 Per capita CO2 emissions with respect to energy consumption and cement production in Latin 
America and the Caribbean also show an upward trajectory, although with non-linear oscillations and 
major differences among countries (see figure VII.8). These per capita emissions trajectories in the 
countries are positively correlated with the evolution of energy consumption and per capita GDP (see 
figures VII.9(a) and VII.9(b)). So, for all Latin American and Caribbean countries, there is a positive 
association between per capita emissions, per capita energy consumption and per capita GDP (see figure 


















































































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA CO2 EMISSIONS AND 
PER CAPITA GDP, 1990-2005 



















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute (WRI), 
“Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009 for CO2 emissions statistics and 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA CO2 EMISSIONS AND 
PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 2005 
(Tons per inhabitant and barrels of oil equivalent per inhabitant) 
 















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009, for CO2 emissions 
statistics and information from Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA CO2 EMISSIONS AND 
PER CAPITA GDP, 2005 













Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009, and Economic 
Indicators and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP at constant 2000 prices. 
 
 Trends in the CO2 intensity of energy and the energy intensity of GDP for Latin America and the 
Caribbean overall are mixed, although reductions are more frequent in energy intensity than in carbon 
intensity (see figure VII.11).  
 
Figure VII.11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF ENERGY 





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009; Economic Indicators 
and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP at constant 2000 prices and information from Latin American Energy 
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 Trajectories for energy intensity and decarbonization oscillate somewhat over time and show 
large differences from one country to another. This suggests that these two processes may change 
significantly and that the BAU scenario is merely one possibility. Consideration of the full array of 
variations may even lead to the formulation of opposing scenarios. In general, however, for the region 
overall, the only way of reducing emissions in absolute terms would be by means of energy decoupling, 
decarbonization or both at the floor level of emissions records for the period. Projections to 2100 
(Samaniego and Galindo, 2009a) show that:  
 
• In Latin America and the Caribbean per capita CO2 emissions will grow at an average annual 
rate of 2.3% under the assumptions of the BAU scenario. 
 
• In the BAU scenario, by 2100 seven countries will have exceeded 19.9 tons of CO2 emissions 
per capita —the current figure for the United States— associated with energy consumption 
and cement production.4 
 
• It is important to note that under extreme scenarios, i.e. those with the highest growth rates in 
energy and carbon intensity, several countries post rapid and unsustainable growth rates, 
reaching over 100 tons of emissions per capita.  
 
• For most of the countries, scenarios incorporating an increase in energy or carbon efficiency 
result in decreases in per capita emissions of CO2, or moderate growth of under 1%, with 
very few exceptions.  
 
 The importance of energy decoupling and decarbonization may be demonstrated by means of a 
simulation exercise estimating per capita CO2 emissions for the Latin American and Caribbean region, 
based on comparisons with the world’s largest emitters. Supposing constant per capita GDP in Latin 
America and the Caribbean for 2005, the exercise estimates the level of per capita emissions the region 
would produce if its energy intensity and decarbonization rates were similar to those of the United 
States, the European Union or China. The results show that, in general, the countries of the region 
would reduce per capita emissions if their energy intensity and decarbonization structure were similar 
to that of the United States and the European Union, and would increase per capita emissions if their 
structure were similar to that of China. Overall, the region’s per capita emissions performance improves 
under the first two scenarios, with per capita emissions declining from 2.6 to 2.3 tons of CO2 applying 
the structure of the United States and from 2.6 to 2 tons of CO2 applying the European Union structure. 
However, the region’s emissions rise to 12.8 tons of CO2 per capita if the values corresponding to 
China’s economy are applied. 
 
 Accordingly, it may be observed that Latin America and the Caribbean needs to maintain a strong 
growth rate in the coming decades and that its per capita emissions are notably lower than those of the 
developed countries. This means that the region has some room for manoeuvre that it must use to put in 
place a long-term strategy for moving onto a trajectory of energy decoupling and decarbonization.  
 
 
                                                     
4  This does not include the particular case of Trinidad and Tobago, which already matches the United States in 
terms of emissions per capita. 
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2. Energy demand and energy intensities 
 
The evolution of energy intensity depends on a broad range of factors, including: evolution and changes 
in the sectoral structure of GDP (for example, stronger development of energy-intensive industries); 
relative prices both of energy and of machinery and equipment; technological changes and shifts in modes 
of production; the urbanization under way in the region; policies relating to access to new and modern 
sources of energy; trends in equipment efficiency and access to it; better satisfaction of needs and 
improvements in well-being, reflected in energy services; the existence of institutional barriers; and the 
public policies implemented. 
 
 Econometric estimates of energy demand run for South America using cointegration methods 
indicate that, although demand varies by country, its per capita income elasticity (ηy) is generally very high 
(even higher than 1), but its price elasticity (ηp) is very low, moving between values of 0 and -0.2 (see table 
VII.1). This points to the importance of income in facilitating access to equipment. Equipment and 
equipment prices could therefore be a more important variable in explaining the evolution of consumption 
than energy prices themselves, at least in end-consumption sectors. In production sectors, as energy 
consumption is a derived demand, activity levels appear repeatedly as the most important variable in 
explaining energy demand patterns. All in all, these estimates indicate that continuous economic growth in 
the region will be accompanied by rising energy demand. The low price elasticity of energy demand 
reflects multiple factors, such as those already mentioned, which would have to be analysed in detail on a 




LATIN AMERICA: ESTIMATED ENERGY DEMAND ELASTICITIES, 1985-2007 
 ηy t-stat ηp t-stat 
Argentina 1.20 7.67 -0.02 -4.14 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.36 4.78 -0.01 -0.02 
Brazil 1.94 8.29 -0.01 -9.16 
Chile 0.99 27.44 -0.07 -4.16 
Colombia 0.34 2.38 -0.15 -5.28 
Ecuador 1.45 7.76 -0.07 -7.20 
Paraguay 0.65 1.95 -0.22 -8.64 
Peru 0.70 15.14 -0.01 -6.71 
Uruguay 0.63 4.68 -0.03 -3.18 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.36 2.28 -0.11 -17.25 
Group 1.06 26.04 -0.07 -20.79 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Latin American 
Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System (SIEE) for total energy consumption statistics 






PUBLIC POLICIES LABORATORY 
 
Econometric estimates of energy demand can be used to simulate various public policy alternatives. Generally 
speaking, the results show that demand for energy is highly sensitive to income trends, albeit perhaps somewhat 
lagged (Galindo, 2009), and that it is fairly insensitive to changes in relative prices. The low price sensitivity of 
energy consumption in the region suggests that it is necessary to promote mechanisms to increase that elasticity. 
This requires economies to have suitable substitution alternatives. However, the negative externalities associated 
with the consumption of fossil fuels suggest that the energy prices are likely to increase in the future, as a result of 
either a carbon tax (Nordhaus, 2008) or rising oil prices. This would mean realigning the vector of relative prices in 
the economy including wages, the real exchange rate, energy prices and interest rates. With this in mind, the 
consequences of different pricing policies were simulated, using the following scenarios: 
 
 (i) A per capita GDP growth rate of 2% in all the countries with no changes in relative energy prices. 
 (ii) A per capita GDP growth rate of 2% in all the countries with a 2% increase in relative energy prices. 
 (iii) A per capita GDP growth rate of 2% in all the countries with a 4% increase in relative energy prices. 
 
 The results show that in scenario I, aggregate energy consumption would rise by an average annual rate of 
3.36% up to 2100. A 2% rise in relative energy prices (scenario II) brings an average annual increase of 3.33% for 
the same period. Lastly, a 4% rise in relative energy prices (scenario III) would generate an average annual increase 
of 3.31% in energy consumption. These simulations are summarized in the figures below, which shows that energy 
consumption continues to rise in all cases regardless of price increases. So, given the current price elasticities of 
energy demand, it is highly unlikely that demand patterns can be controlled simply by raising prices, although the 
effects vary by country. Such a policy would, however, have significant impacts on tax collection. 
 





























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Latin American 
Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy-Economic Information System (SIEE) for total energy consumption statistics 
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3. Emissions, productivity and convergence in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Emissions per unit of GDP are different for each of the Latin American and Caribbean countries but, in 
general, they are lower than the world average (see figure VII.12). Accordingly, the region has a strong 
competitive advantage in an international scenario of caps or taxes on CO2 emissions. The emissions 
intensity of GDP falls as per capita GDP rises, although at non-linear rates that differ from one country to 
the next and by groups of countries. This is borne out by the econometric estimations of smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) models (González, Teräsvirsta and Van Dijk, 2005), which show the per capita 
income elasticity of emissions declining in the region. Reductions in response sensitivities of emissions to 
per capita income are, however, insufficient to decouple trajectories of growth in per capita income and in 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CO2 EMISSIONS PER UNIT OF GDP, 2005 



















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009, Economic Indicators 
and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP at constant 2000 prices and Social Indicators Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
 
 
 There is an inverse correlation between the rate of decoupling of emissions from GDP and the 
growth rate of per capita GDP (Vivid economics, 2009). Countries with a higher rate of per capita 
economic growth are also those that most rapidly reduce their emissions per unit of GDP, though this is 
highly variable (see figure VII.13). A high rate of economic growth is therefore not inconsistent with the 
ability to reduce emissions per unit of output. Accordingly, economic growth can be combined with 




































































































































































































































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH AND RATE OF 




















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009, Economic Indicators 
and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP constant at 2000 prices and Social Indicators Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
a The decoupling rate is defined as the inverse of the growth rate of the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP, i.e., a reduction in this 
ratio implies an increase in the decoupling rate, and vice versa.  
 
 
 Trajectories of per capita emissions are seen to show a process of absolute convergence (β-
convergence) or convergence in the distribution of per capita CO2 emissions (σ-convergence) (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1992). In other words, the increase of per capita emissions of countries with lower per capita 
emissions is higher than that of countries with higher per capita emissions (see figure VII.14). Econometric 
analysis of cross section and panel data confirm this process of absolute convergence in per capita emissions 
(see box VII.2).5 This suggests that in the coming decades per capita emissions will increase for the region 
overall and will tend to converge in absolute terms if the baseline scenario is maintained. 
 
                                                     
5  Changes in the production structure, gains in production efficiency, relative price trends and more stringent 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA EMISSIONS AND GROWTH IN 
PER CAPITA EMISSIONS, 1990-2005 


















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009 and Social Indicators 
Statistics Database (BADEINSO) for population data.  
 
Box VII.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ABSOLUTE 
CONVERGENCE IN PER CAPITA EMISSIONS 
 





















where a coefficient of β<0 indicates a process of absolute convergence. The coefficient α captures the specific effects by country 
and Xt represents a set of additional factors that enable the possibility of conditional convergence to be identified. Estimation of 
equation (1), based on cross-section and panel data (Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 2005) for 1990-2005 for the countries of Latin 
America is given in equations (2) and (3). Estimation of equation (3) rejects the null hypothesis of the Hausman test (1978), 
thereby rejecting random effects specification in favour of fixed effects. Moreover, the statistical significance of the dummy 
variables by counties reflects regional differences (Romer, 1989; Barro, 1991). These results indicate that a process of absolute 










 (2.19) (-2.04) 
Source:  J.L. Samaniego and L.M. Galindo, “Cambio climático y la demanda de energía en América Latina: estimaciones 
preliminares”, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009, unpublished. 
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4. Emissions and land-use change in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
GHG emissions from land-use change in the Latin American and Caribbean countries showed a 
substantial 6.1% increase between 1980 and 1990, which was partially offset by a 3.5% fall in emissions 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:a CO2 EMISSIONS FROM LAND-USE CHANGE, 
1980-2000 
























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009. 
a The countries are ordered by magnitude of emissions as of 2000.  Data not available for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
 
 Emissions from land-use change generally have a non-linear inverse association with per capita 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GDP AND CO2 EMISSIONS FROM 
LAND-USE CHANGE, 1990-2000 a 





































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009,Economic Indicators 
and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP 2000 constant prices and Social Indicators Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
a  The countries are ordered by magnitude of emissions as of 2000. Data not available for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
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 The reduction in emissions with respect to per capita GDP is captured by identities (3) and (4). 
Identity (3) assumes a coefficient that is constant over time. In identity (4), the first term represents the 
increase in emissions between time t and time t+1, assuming a constant ratio between emissions intensity 
and per capita GDP. The second term represents the increase or decrease in emissions at t+1 caused by 
changes in the emissions coefficient. Accordingly, the second term should be negative for an economy 





(4) EMt+1 – EMt = α0t(YPCit+1 – YPCit) + YPCit+1 (α1t+1 - α0t) 
 
where EMt represents GHG emissions and YPCt is per capita GDP.  
 
 The data available on the ratio of emissions from land-use change (LUC) to per capita GDP in 
Latin America and the Caribbean shows mixed trends although the ratio is tending to fall in most of the 
countries (see figure VII.16). The simple average annual rate of decrease in the intensity of LUC 
emissions for all the countries examined is 4.4% for 1990–2000, although with significant differences 
between countries (see figures VII.17 and VII.18).  
 
Figure VII.17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN THE LUC CO2 





















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009, Economic Indicators 
and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP at constant 2000 prices and Social Indicators Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
a The countries are ordered by magnitude of emissions in 2000. Data not available for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 







































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LUC EMISSIONS INTENSITY OF 
PER CAPITA GDP, 1990-2000 a 








































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009, Economic Indicators 
and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP at constant 2000 prices and Social Indicators Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
a  The countries are ordered by magnitude of emissions in 2000. Data not available for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
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 The increase in the efficiency of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is reflected in the 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATE OF CHANGE IN LUC EMISSIONS INTENSITY OF 
PER CAPITA GDP (α1t+1 - α0t), 1990-2000
 a 





































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009, Economic Indicators 
and Statistics Database (BADECON) for GDP at constant 2000 prices and Social Indicators Statistics Database 
(BADEINSO) for population data. 
a  The countries are ordered by magnitude of emissions as of 2000. Data not available for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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 A first approach to the evolution of LUC emissions may be simulated by assuming a coefficient 
of LUC emissions to per capita GDP falling in line with its historical average (1990-2000) in each 
country. These simulations are summarized in figure VII.20 which shows that CO2 emissions from land-
use changes tend to decline in the BAU scenario. 
 
Figure VII.20 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROJECTIONS OF GROWTH 
IN LUC CO2 EMISSIONS, 2000-2100 






































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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 In general, in this scenario, Latin America and the Caribbean would reduce its LUC emissions by 
2.6% per year for the period 2001–2100. This reduction is unlikely, however, since the projected level of 
LUC emissions involves complex processes and many variables. Accordingly, constant LUC emissions 
are assumed for 2005–2100.  
 
 
5. Emissions and deforestation rates 
 
Deforestation is one of the principal factors contributing to LUC emissions and the occurrence of severe 
negative externalities. In Latin America and the Caribbean, deforestation is also one of the main obstacles 
to sustainable development. The surface area of forested land decreased between 1990 and 2005 in the 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN: LAND USE CHANGES 










































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH 






















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of statistics of Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
a  Does not include countries whose forested areas showed no variation. 
 
 
 Deforestation is influenced by economic, social, political, demographic and institutional factors. 
Generally speaking, the economic actors with the greatest impact on deforestation are acknowledged to be 
agricultural and livestock producers and their array of associated agents (Torres, 2009). This is reflected, 
for example, in an inverse correlation between forested and agricultural areas (see figure VII.23). 
Demographic pressures, reflected in the proportion of the rural population, also relate inversely to 



































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROPORTIONS OF FORESTED AND AGRICULTURAL 

































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of statistics from the Food and 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROPORTIONS OF FORESTED AREA AND OF RURAL 

































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of statistics from the Food and 




6. Total CO2 emissions in Latin America 
 
Under the BAU scenario and assuming constant LUC emissions, total CO2 emissions, including energy 
consumption, cement production and LUC, increase by an average of 1.5% for 2005-2100, though with 
differences from one country to another (see figure VII.25). This means that CO2 emissions will grow 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROJECTED TOTAL CO2 EMISSIONS, 2005-2100 
a 





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a  The countries are ordered by the magnitude of their emissions in 2005.  
 
 
7. Mitigation in Central America 
 
 
The Central American countries together contribute less than 0.5% of all GHG emissions at the global 
level. However, different mitigation options could be beneficial for the region since, for example, there 
are major gains to be obtained from making an early start on decarbonization in terms of the availability 
of international financing and access to cleaner technologies. Some of these measures also offer 
significant co-benefits.6 
 
 Using inventories of sectoral emissions, it is possible to carry out projections assuming specific 
growth rates in each of the relevant sectors in the different countries. In the baseline estimate, growth 
rates are assumed for sectors of the economy in accordance with the macroeconomic scenarios (Cuevas 
and Lennox, 2009) for the cut-off years 2010, 2020 and 2030. Projection of the baseline scenario to 2030 
gives total annual emissions of over 300 million tons of CO2e.
7 Based on the average cost scenarios per 
ton of CO2e reduction in each of the sectors examined, an incremental or marginal cost horizon can be 
constructed combining these scenarios with the differences in sectoral emissions between the BAU 
scenario and the proposed emissions reduction scenario. These costs do not take into account the potential 
                                                     
6  This section is based on Cuevas and Lennox (2009). The database used is not the same as that used for the 
comparative analysis for Latin America and Central America overall. Hence, particular figures may not coincide. 
In addition, the sectoral growth assumptions used are different to those used in the previous section.  
7  In this exercise the emissions factors were calculated using the IPCC methodology for clean development 
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co-benefits such as the conservation of biodiversity and water capture areas, the reduction of local-impact 
pollutant emissions, poverty reduction and the development of sustainable economic alternatives. Based 
on information from one of the cost curves for Mexico, figure VII.26 gives a graphic representation of the 
sequential relationship between average costs and potential emissions reduction up to 2020, which could 




MEXICO: MARGINAL COST CURVE OF MITIGATION, 2020 






















Source: L.M. Galindo, La economía del cambio climático en México, Mexico city, Secretariat of the Environment and Natural 
Resources (SEMARNAT), 2009. 
 
 
8. Mitigation costs: preliminary aggregate estimates using international data 
 
For purely illustrative purposes, an initial aggregate economic assessment of the potential costs of 
mitigation can be conducted assuming a cost of between US$ 10 and US$ 30 per ton of carbon and that 
this value is equivalent to the opportunity cost of emissions. Table VII.2 summarizes the potential costs of 
mitigation by country, supposing an emissions reduction of 30% with respect to BAU emissions up to 
2100. These results show that the costs of mitigation processes are certainly significant for the region and 









































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT VALUE OF THE COSTS OF MITIGATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE UP TO 2100 AS A PERCENTAGE OF 2007 GDP a 
 Price per ton: US$ 10 Price per ton: US$ 30 
 Discount rate Discount rate 
 0.5% 2% 4% 0.5% 2% 4% 
Argentina 0.64 0.31 0.15 1.93 0.92 0.44 
Barbados 0.31 0.16 0.09 0.92 0.49 0.27 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1.98 0.95 0.45 5.95 2.84 1.36 
Brazil 1.89 0.81 0.34 5.67 2.44 1.02 
Chile 0.49 0.25 0.13 1.46 0.74 0.39 
Colombia 1.62 0.72 0.31 4.86 2.16 0.94 
Costa Rica 1.56 0.66 0.27 4.68 1.97 0.80 
Cuba 0.50 0.25 0.13 1.51 0.75 0.39 
Ecuador 1.96 0.94 0.45 5.89 2.81 1.35 
El Salvador 0.45 0.22 0.11 1.35 0.67 0.34 
Grenada 8.67 3.33 1.15 26.02 9.99 3.45 
Guatemala 1.74 0.77 0.34 5.23 2.32 1.01 
Guyana 0.31 0.18 0.11 0.94 0.54 0.32 
Haiti 0.39 0.20 0.10 1.17 0.60 0.31 
Honduras 0.67 0.34 0.18 2.02 1.02 0.53 
Jamaica 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.03 
Mexico 0.30 0.16 0.09 0.90 0.48 0.26 
Nicaragua 2.10 0.97 0.44 6.31 2.90 1.33 
Panama 3.05 1.23 0.47 9.16 3.70 1.40 
Paraguay 3.38 1.38 0.53 10.13 4.14 1.59 
Peru 1.67 0.73 0.31 5.02 2.18 0.92 
Dominican Republic 3.40 1.41 0.56 10.20 4.23 1.68 
Suriname 3.91 1.83 0.87 11.72 5.48 2.60 
Trinidad and Tobago - - - - - - 
Uruguay 0.59 0.27 0.12 1.76 0.80 0.36 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) - - - - - - 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Resources Institute 
(WRI), “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0” [online] www.cait.wri.org, 2009.  





9. Main messages 
 
The empirical evidence available for Latin America and the Caribbean shows that regular relations exist 
between GHG emissions and their main determining factors, on the basis of which various deductions and 
simulations about alternative emissions scenarios can be made.  
 
 The simulations carried out show that, in general, emissions may be expected to increase 
throughout this century by an average of up to 1.5%, although with major differences between countries 
and emission sources. Emissions from land-use change may be expected to decrease or stand still, while 
those from fossil fuel burning and cement production will increase. This increase of emissions from 
energy consumption has a number of particular characteristics: 
 
• Energy consumption tracks output and is fairly insensitive to changes in relative energy 
prices. However, energy intensity decreases as per capita GDP increases. There is, therefore, 
a gradual decline in energy intensity, or energy decoupling.  
 
• Emissions are increasing at a lower rate than energy consumption, showing a process of 
decarbonization. In addition, the ratio of emissions to GDP varies in inverse proportion to the 
growth rate of per capita GDP.  
 
• Emissions are rising at a faster rate than population growth, so that per capita emissions are 
increasing. The evidence also points to a process of absolute convergence in per capita 
emissions in the region. Accordingly, emissions in the countries with lower per capita 
emissions will increase more quickly than those of countries with higher per capita emissions. 
 
• The evidence overall suggests that the emissions of the Latin American and Caribbean region 
will continue to rise, albeit more slowly than in the past. 
 
 The evidence available shows that the region has significant options for mitigation. Some of them 
are already being deployed, but at the aggregate level the costs of mitigation are significant. However, 
ratios of energy to per capita GDP and of emissions to energy fall as per capita GDP rises. This suggests 







VIII. ECONOMIC VALUATION AND OBSERVATIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
Climate change is one of the major challenges of this century. Its impacts on economic activities and 
current production, distribution and consumption patterns, on population, on ecosystems and, in general, 
on living conditions on the planet make it one of the most daunting issues for humankind. It is therefore 
crucial to identify the channels of transmission and the most significant economic costs of climate change. 
This is no easy task since a wide range of highly uncertain factors and various ethical considerations must 
be taken into account and reflected in the adoption of an optimum risk-management strategy.  
 
 The international empirical evidence available on the economic costs and benefits of climate 
change is highly varied and mixed (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Nordhaus, 2008; Fankhauser, 1995; 
Mendelsohn, 2002; and Stern, 2007), given the wide range of methodologies and time periods, analytical 
models and economic assumptions (for example, the inclusion of adaptation processes and the application 
of new technologies), as well as different climate projections, differential analysis of sectors, regions or 
countries and even varying discount rates and proposed mitigation targets used. The evidence presented 
must be examined with caution since it is merely indicative of the scenarios that may emerge in the 
future. 
 
 At the aggregate level, the economic impacts of climate change calculated so far in the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean present various characteristics as indicated below:8 
 
• The economic costs associated with climate change are significant and non-linear and they 
have been increasing over time. In other words the economic consequences of climate change 
have a discernible and significant impact on all economic activity.  
 
• The economic costs are heterogeneous and climate change may translate into short-term gains 
for some sectors and activities and, at the same time, into significant losses in other 
geographical areas or sectors. 
 
• In many cases, the impacts, such as loss of biodiversity or human life, are irreversible. 
 
• Some endogenous adaptation measures exist in the intrinsic response capacity of the 
economic actors. Their costs have not been calculated, but could be reduced by designing 
public policies aimed at adaptation. 
 
• Figures VIII.1 and VIII.2 sum up the valuation of total economic costs and benefits for Latin 
America and the Caribbean using currently available information. These estimates are 
preliminary, indicative and incomplete, but show that the costs of the impacts generally 
exceed those estimated in developed countries. This is not necessarily the case for all 
countries, however. 
                                                     
8  It should be borne in mind that the results do not include the impacts of climate change on all economic sectors, 
although they probably do include the most relevant ones. Also, there are fiscal, labour, social and other 




LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE 
CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND MITIGATION, UP TO 2100 a 













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
a The mitigation target used is equivalent to 30% of the levels projected for 2100. Includes: Argentina, Belize, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. A discount rate of 0.5% was applied. The impact 
and costs correspond to the average of the values recorded in the countries under consideration. 
 
Figure VIII.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (23 COUNTRIES): PRELIMINARY CUMULATIVE 
ECONOMIC COSTS OF MITIGATION UP TO 2100 





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
a  The mitigation target used is equivalent to 30% of the levels projected for 2100. A discount rate of 0.5% was 
applied. The price per ton of CO2 was US$ 30. 
Mitigation (US$ 10 per ton): 0.7% 
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• For all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the economic costs associated with 
the impacts of climate change are higher than those of participating in a mitigation agreement 
that recognizes historical responsibility and imposes differential targets by region in 
accordance with the principles of equity and co-responsibility. 
 
• The simultaneous implementation of efficient adaptation and mitigation actions means that 
current patterns of production, distribution and consumption will have to be changed 
substantially. 
 
 When drawing up an international agreement, it must be recognized that those countries that have 
contributed most to climate change are not necessarily those that are suffering the greatest impacts and, 
indeed, many countries with only a marginal contribution to emissions may be bearing the brunt of these 
impacts. Thus, any international agreement on climate change must take into account the need of 
developing countries to maintain a good rate of economic growth and obtain additional international 
financing in order to make the transition to low-carbon economies. Unilateral solutions may lead to the 
imposition of adjustment processes that are inequitable from the perspective of developing countries, that 
is, the externalization of mitigation and the concentration of mitigation efforts in those countries, without 
reducing their vulnerability to climate change (and the resulting costs of adaptation).  
 
 Given the magnitude of the economic costs associated with climate change, a public-policy 
strategy must be designed and implemented in which society as a whole can participate, that helps to 
reduce the adverse effects of this phenomenon, facilitates adaptation processes and develops options for 
reducing mitigation costs. This will mean preparing an adequate risk management strategy. This is an 
extremely complex task, however, and one that must be based not only on technical factors, but also on 
ethical considerations. Nevertheless, regardless of the climate scenarios or the public policy adopted, 
there are a few general points that seem to be common to any such strategy:  
 
• “Taking out insurance” against the most extreme climate risks and the severest damage 
expected. 
 
• Preserving biodiversity and natural resources for future generations and avoiding irreparable 
losses. 
 
• Realigning relative prices in a manner compatible with sustainable development.  
 
• Recognizing the need to review lifestyles and promote a cultural change in that regard.  
 
• Promoting a technological innovation process in the context of sustainable development.  
 
• Transiting to low-carbon economies. Modern economies are fossil fuel-intensive. It must be 
recognized that the era of cheap, almost limitless fossil energy is coming to an end; relative 
energy prices must fully reflect the negative externalities generated by it.  
 
 Generally speaking, the evidence on the economic consequences of climate change points to the 
need to take into account the following considerations when formulating relevant public policies by it:  
 
• Climate change policies must be at the heart of macroeconomic policy and policies on 
development and technological innovation. They must be directed towards changing 
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behaviour and ways of thinking in order to put in place procedures for making decisions that 
are sustainable in the long term.  
 
• Generally, prices and markets are important mechanisms that can contribute to sustainable 
economic development, although they are insufficient and have major limitations due to the 
low price elasticities currently observed in the region and other market characteristics. 
Other mechanisms that complement price measures such as regulatory interventions, 
promotion of technological innovation and changes in consumption, distribution and 
production patterns must also be taken into account. Thus, the aim must be to apply a 
relative prices policy based on a ramp trajectory, which gradually reflects the negative 
externalities and allows time for adjustments, and this policy should be complemented with 
the necessary regulations. Climate change, understood as a negative externality, can be 
reduced by putting a price on CO2 emissions (Stern, 2007). This price must be equitable, 
agreed internationally and provide for specific conditions; furthermore all the policies 
implemented must be oriented in the same direction. 
 
 Regulations must aim to:  
 
• Reduce the energy and carbon content per unit of output and per capita and promoting new 
technologies at affordable costs.  
• Conserve natural resources and biodiversity.  
• Moderate and compensate for the economic impacts attributable to climate change. 
 
 When implementing adaptation measures, decision-makers must prioritize those that hold up 
under any climate or economic scenario, that generate significant collateral benefits such as reducing 
other environmental impacts or poverty and that are consistent with mitigation strategies. They must also 
bear in mind that the adaptation measures applied can generate new negative externalities such as 
environmental degradation due to expansion of the agricultural frontier in marginal areas (which must be 
avoided) or overexploitation of hydric resources.  
 
 A set of regular patterns must be considered when designing mitigation processes. In particular, 
attention should be paid to the following: 
 
• Per capita GDP, energy consumption and CO2 emissions have been trending upwards over time, 
albeit at different rates and with different intensities. In general, the tendency is towards 
decoupling of energy from output and of CO2 emissions from energy although, again, at different 
rates, which are insufficient to curtail the absolute increase in emissions or energy consumption. 
 
• Higher economic output is reflected in a higher level of energy consumption, although the 
increases are not proportional. Thus, any drastic cutback in energy consumption will result in 
a contraction in output. Sustained economic growth with steady emissions reduction, or at 
least some degree of stabilization, is a desirable goal but remains difficult to reach. 
 
• There is an inverse correlation between per capita income and energy intensity. This energy 
decoupling is still insufficient, however, to halt the increase in energy consumption. Moreover, 
energy decoupling is more common than decarbonization, which seems to indicate that the 
pattern of GHG emissions is not yet being treated as a major concern in the region. The 
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reduction in the energy intensity-to-GDP ratio and in the emissions-to-energy consumption 
ratio merely helps to slow growth in emissions, but is insufficient to bring it to a halt. 
 
• All this translates into a gradual reduction in the ratio between emissions and per capita GDP. 
Moreover, the emissions intensity of GDP is tending to decrease faster in countries with 
higher per capita GDP growth.  
 
• In practically all cases, however, there has been a gradual increase in per capita emissions; 
the rate of population growth is lower than the rate of growth in CO2 emissions. Moreover, 
the region shows a gradual absolute convergence in per capita emissions; in other words, 
emissions are increasing faster in those countries where per capita emissions are lower than in 
those where they are higher.  
 
• Simulations point to the likelihood that GHG emissions associated with fossil fuels and cement 
production will continue to increase if the BAU pattern is maintained. The historical trend of 
energy decoupling and decarbonization is insufficient to control the growth in emissions if 
business is allowed to continue as usual. Accordingly, active public policies are required. 
 
 Any mitigation strategy defined for Latin America and the Caribbean must take into account the 
fact that this region has a common but clearly differentiated responsibility in the mitigation process. The 
region should engage in an equitable international agreement that recognizes the following:  
 
• The low contribution of the energy sector in Latin America and the Caribbean to global 
climate change. 
• The need for the region to continue to develop whether on the basis of current growth 
patterns or others that are more sustainable.  
• The importance of complying with the provisions of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in terms of making available additional 
international resources to achieve ambitious mitigation targets.  
• The fact that mitigation actions will not by themselves diminish the region’s vulnerability to 
climate change and that, therefore, international resources are indispensable for facilitating 
adaptation to the effects that this global phenomenon will have on its development and for 
reducing poverty in the least developed countries of the region. 
• The implementation of unilateral mitigation processes in the developed countries could make 
mitigation in Latin America and the Caribbean more costly than it would have been if 
conducted under an international agreement.  
 
 In any event, in this century, climate change will require a change in patterns of growth and 
development. In the context of an international agreement, this will also mean establishing an institutional 
framework capable of mobilizing vast quantities of resources, of verifying their use and monitoring the 
attainment of specific targets.  
 
 Over the coming years, the Latin American and Caribbean region should demonstrate its capacity 
to define its future with full knowledge of the facts, modifying its production, consumption and 
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